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Scholars have recently turned their attention to the subject of children, specifically 
our duties toward them, including questions about their adoption. Mhairi Cowden’s 
article “What’s Love Got to Do with It? Why a Child Does Not Have a Right to Be 
Loved” critiques the view of Matthew Liao that children have a right to be loved.1 
Liao’s justification for his view draws on empirical research about what is necessary 
for the flourishing of children; flourishing understood in terms of physical, emotional, 
and social well-being. After reviewing the empirical literature, Liao concludes that 
children have a right to be loved since children have a right to what is necessary for 
their flourishing, and it is necessary for the flourishing of children that they be loved 
by a parent or guardian. Cowden calls into question Liao’s conclusion by questioning 
both the empirical justification for the claim that love is necessary for the flourishing 
of children and also the very idea that love (at least as it involves emotions) can be 
commanded.
One aspect of Cowden’s strategy admits that children need sufficient human 
interaction, physical and psychological proximity to adults, and experiential stimu-
lation to mature into well-adjusted adults. What she denies is that these things are 
simply the same as “love.” That is, one could imagine cases where a child received 
sufficient human interaction, physical and psychological proximity to adults, and 
experiential stimulation but was not loved, and the empirical question would be, 
Would such treatment undermine the well-being of the child?
This objection raises one of the most ancient and important questions in philoso-
phy: what is love? In the Symposium, the Platonic Socrates explored this question (at 
least as it relates to eros), and the exploration has continued to the present day. One 
1 Mhairi Cowden, “What’s Love Got to Do with It? Why a Child Does Not Have a 
Right to Be Loved,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 15.3 
(June 2011): 325–345. 
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response to Cowden’s objection is to claim “love” is just (positive) human interac-
tion, proximity, and experiential stimulation of the proper kind. Indeed, today not just 
philosophers but also psychologists explore the nature of love. In her book Love 2.0: 
How Our Supreme Emotion Affects Everything We Feel, Think, Do, and Become, the 
positive psychologist Barbara Fredrickson defined love as “the momentary upwelling 
of three tightly interwoven events: first, a sharing of one or more positive emotions 
between you and another; second, a synchrony between your and the other person’s 
biochemistry and behaviors; and third, a reflected motive to invest in each other’s 
well being that brings mutual care.” 2 According to this definition, love necessarily 
includes some aspects of what Liao was talking about, specifically the emphasis 
on proximity and care. And yet, this definition is obviously not the only possible 
understanding of love. For Christians, in fact, Fredrickson’s definition is somewhat 
problematic insofar as it assumes that love, to be really love, must always be mutual. 
But in the view of Jesus, we can love those who do not love us in return. We can and 
should love our enemies (Matt. 5:43–48). 
As so many Socratic dialogues make clear, to define something is difficult, and 
at least part of the dispute between Cowden and Liao is about how to define love. 
When disagreeing about a definition, one strategy is to show that a rival definition 
is too narrow: it excludes an instance that clearly should count within the definition. 
Another strategy is to try to show that a definition is too broad, including things that 
clearly do not fall under the definition. 
Cowden does not offer a rival definition of love. She focuses rather on ways in 
which Liao’s definition fails insofar as it is too broad in some respects and too narrow 
in others. It is too broad because many things, such as beneficial treatment, that are 
typically connected to love, may not in every instance include love. Imagine a racist 
criminal forced to serve people of color at their lunchtime meal who hates those he 
serves but nevertheless provides a beneficial service. Here the benefit is present, but 
love is absent. Cowden objects that Liao’s definition may also be too narrow because 
love may also lead to adverse treatment when combined with ignorance of specifics 
or because the emotions involved lead to distortions in treatment. A mother inspired 
by love gives her child aspirin to relieve his pain, not realizing that aspirin may cause 
potentially fatal Reye’s syndrome. A loving father becomes overly protective of his 
daughter, hindering her social growth, precisely because of his deep love for her. In 
these cases, love is present, but benefit is absent.
Liao responds to Cowden’s article directly and to my mind convincingly.3 Part 
of his response is to challenge Cowden’s empirical claims in part by suggesting that 
the best available empirical research does suggest that children need to experience 
loving actions from caring adults in order to fully flourish as adults. One response 
to the claim of Liao’s definition of love being over-inclusive and under-inclusive 
is to distinguish between what love intends, proximately and remotely, and what 
2 Barbara L. Fredrickson, Love 2.0: How Our Supreme Emotion Affects Everything We 
Feel, Think, Do, and Become (New York: Hudson Street Press, 2013), 17.
3 S. Matthew Liao, “Why Children Need to Be Loved,” Critical Review of International 
Social and Political Philosophy 15.3 (January 2012): 347–358.
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actually results from love. The mother who mistakenly gives her child aspirin may 
truly be inspired by love, despite the fact that rather than benefiting the child, she in 
fact harms her child. Love always aims at securing the good of the beloved, but the 
benevolent aims of love can and do fail for a variety of reasons. 
This brings us back to the question of how to define love. The best understand-
ing of love of which I am aware is provided by Alexander Pruss in his brilliant book 
One Body: An Essay on Christian Sexual Ethics.4 On Pruss’s view, love is not just 
doing good things, but includes appreciation of the one we love and seeking unity 
in appropriate ways with the one we love. The racist criminal mentioned earlier is 
lacking both these elements. He does not appreciate the good in those he serves, he 
does not want to be united with them, and he is united with them only under compul-
sion, hence his will is not freely united with them. The criminal is not really loving 
despite having one of the elements of love—beneficial action. If we adopt Pruss’s 
definition, then the problem suggested by Cowden disappears. 
That parents should love their children is not as controversial an assertion as 
that people who wish to become parents have a duty to pursue this desire only by 
adoption rather than by procreation. In their article “The Bad Habit of Bearing Chil-
dren,” Heleana Theixos and S. B. Jamil scrutinize the choice to procreate and raise 
biological children and argue that adults who desire children should adopt children 
rather than have their own biological children.5 Many premises of Theixos and Jamil’s 
argument are well established, such as that orphans (defined by them as children 
without a primary caregiver) characteristically suffer mental, social, and physical 
problems both in the short term and in the long term to a much greater degree than 
non-orphans. The second premise of their argument is that we also have a serious (but 
defeasible) obligation to care for those who are in need. They appeal to Peter Singer’s 
formulation of this obligation: “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from 
happening, without thereby sacrificing something of comparable moral importance, 
we ought, morally, to do it. . . . [This principle] requires us only to prevent what is 
bad, and not to promote what is good, and it requires this of us only when we can 
do it without sacrificing anything that is, from the moral point of view, comparably 
important.” 6 The conclusion they draw is that those who desire to be parents have 
a serious obligation to adopt existing orphans rather than have their own biological 
children. The authors criticize what they call “bionormativity”: the presumption 
that the biological bonds created by procreation are superior to other ways to form 
families, such as via adoption. 
A key but relatively unexplored aspect of their argument is the relationship 
between duty and desire. On the one hand, the desire to be a biological parent, to 
experience pregnancy and childbirth, and to nurse one’s own biological offspring 
4 Alexander Pruss, “Love and Its Forms,” in One Body: An Essay in Christian Sexual 
Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012), 8–48.
5 Heleana Theixos and S. B. Jamil, “The Bad Habit of Bearing Children,” International 
Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 7.1 (Spring 2014): 35–45. 
6 Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1.3 
(Spring 1972): 241.
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is, on Theixos and Jamil’s view, said to be not so important as to justify forgoing 
adopting an orphan in favor of natural procreation. On the other hand, a person who 
does not desire to become a parent has no obligation to adopt an orphan precisely 
because of a lack of desire to be a parent. Now, for some people, the desire not to 
be a parent might be quite weak. Such persons may have no positive desire to be 
parents, but if it “happened,” they would not be very upset at all. On the other hand, 
other people have extremely strong desires not just to be parents, but to be biological 
parents. These intense desires to be biological parents lead some people to spend 
thousands and thousands of dollars on in vitro fertilization, to undergo painful and 
intrusive medical procedures, and to seek out the challenges of pregnancy. What is 
unclear about Theixos and Jamil’s view is why very weak desires not to be a parent 
defeat the general obligation to adopt orphans, but very strong desires to become a 
biological parent do not defeat this general obligation. 
Why are some desires, even weak ones, so decisive in shaping our ethical duties 
while other, perhaps much stronger, desires are not? One answer is that becoming a 
parent is such a momentous change in one’s identity that even a weak desire not to 
be a parent is morally decisive. But this argument depends upon how one conceives 
of one’s identity. In some cases, particularly cases when one is already a parent, 
adding an additional child may do little to change one’s fundamental identity. When 
considering the desire to be biological parents, Theixos and Jamil write, “We think 
that proposed defeaters that are based in the agent’s desire cannot carry more moral 
weight than the moral duty of rescuing these children.” 7 But this same principle, if 
applied to the desire not to be a parent, leads to the conclusion that all adults who 
are able to care for orphans have an obligation to become parents. 
Theixos and Jamil’s view also holds that the onerous paperwork, time, financial 
cost, and hassles of adoption defeat the obligation to rescue orphans. Unfortunately, 
they are correct that adoption often involves a troublesomely difficult process. But 
surely the difficulties of the process of adoption, given its lamentable expenses and 
hassles, are not morally comparable to the sufferings of unadopted orphans. Given the 
choice between allowing a child to remain an orphan and going through the hassles 
of adoption, no reasonable person behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance would choose 
to let a child remain an orphan, since the short-term and long-terms difficulties of a 
child with no caregiver vastly overmaster those of going through an adoption. 
In a response to Theixos and Jamil’s article, Karey Horwood, in “Bad Habit or 
Considered Decision,” considers whether perhaps Theixos and Jamil have underes-
timated the importance of “bionormativity.” She writes,
No doubt all of us absorb messages about the “superiority” of biological pro-
creation, just as we absorb heteronormative messages about the necessity of 
having one mother and one father, and just as we absorb messages that children 
must be raised in a family with two parents rather than in a communal setting. 
All of these normative ideals could be equally arbitrary and indefensible. Or 
maybe some of them, upon closer examination, might hold up to scrutiny. 
The point is that without digging deeply into the particulars to ferret out the  
7 Theixos and Jamil, “The Bad Habit of Bearing Children,” 40. 
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difference between mere habit (or even prejudice) and a well-considered con-
viction about the basis of human flourishing, there is no place from which to 
stand and judge with confidence that “all preferences that can be formulated 
as based on conceptions of parenting rooted in bionormative values cannot 
override the orphan’s claim to rescue.” 8
What differences, if any, exist on average between children raised by their own bio-
logical parents and children raised by parents who adopted them? This is an interesting 
empirical question.9 Often, adoption is the best response to troubled circumstances, 
but perhaps even better is procreation in advantageous circumstances. 
Another aspect of the subject of adoption is embryo adoption.10 Thomas Nel-
son’s article “Personhood and Embryo Adoption” defends the thesis that heterologous 
embryo transfer for rescue (HETr), the transfer of a human embryo to a woman who 
is not biologically the mother of the embryo, is morally impermissible. He notes that 
opponents of HETr often argue that the procreative good includes not just conception 
of a human being but also the nurturance of a human being in utero. Nelson takes 
a different route to the conclusion that HETr is wrong in arguing that it violates the 
proper bodily relationship between persons. 
Nelson does not oppose all embryo transfer. He holds that for a biological 
mother to accept into her womb her own biological child in his or her embryonic 
stage of development does not seem intrinsically wrong. So, on his view, it is not 
the transferring of an embryo into a uterus that makes the action wrong, but rather 
something else, namely, the lack of relationship between the embryo and the potential 
gestational mother. 
Drawing on the work of Karol Wojtyla, Richard of St. Victor, and others, Nelson 
points out that to be a person is not an isolated monad, but exists in actual and potential 
relationship with other persons who share incommunicability, a kind of uniqueness. 
“Recall that incommunicability is the premier attribute of persons and refers to 
that which cannot be shared. An incommunicable being has a certain metaphysical 
absoluteness and so cannot just instantiate a type.” 11 So, even though all of us share 
in human nature and instantiate the kind “human being,” there is also something 
about each one of us that is utterly unique and unrepeatable. Nelson continues, “In 
general as incommunicability increases, so does relational exclusivity. There are 
certain relationships that are incommunicable and exclusive as relationships.” 12 The 
spousal relationship is one such kind of exclusive relationship. It is impermissible to 
    8 Karey Harwood, “Bad Habit or Considered Decision: The Need for a Closer Exami-
nation of Prospective Parents’ Views,” International Journal of Feminist Approaches to 
Bioethics 7.1 (Spring 2014): 50.
    9 For some information on the differences, see “Adopted Chidren,” Child Trends 
DataBank, August 2012, http://www.childtrends.org/?indicators=adopted-children.
10 Michel Accad, “Heterologous Embryo Transfer: Magisterial Answers and Metaphysi-
cal Questions,” Linacre Quarterly 81.1 (February 2014): 38–46.
11 Thomas K. Nelson, “Personhood and Embryo Adoption,” Linacre Quarterly 79.3 
(August 2012): 267.
12 Ibid.
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“swap” spouses because a person’s spouse, unlike the person’s car battery, stands in 
unique relationship to the person. In a similar way, Nelson argues, the relationship 
between biological mother and biological child involves a “total bodily union” such 
that it is impermissible for a woman who is not biologically related to an embryo to 
gestate this embryo. “In pregnancy, the embryo who is ‘of’ the mother is incorporated 
‘in’ the mother, who gives her body and person totally. As such, pregnancy invokes 
the incommunicable exclusivity of interpersonal bodily relationships. The rescuer, 
despite the best of intentions, enters into a bodily relationship with an embryo that is 
meant only for its mother, who can never be reduced to just the ‘genetic’ mother.” 13
Although Nelsom’s conclusion—that HETr is ethically impermissible—may 
be correct, I do not find Nelson’s argument for this conclusion persuasive. First, 
incommunicability as a characteristic of persons is like evenness (or oddness) as 
characteristic of numbers. These characteristics are binary. For this reason, it would 
be improper to speak of the evenness of a number increasing, since evenness is a 
characteristic that does not admit of degrees. A number is either even or it is not, 
but no number is more even than another. So too it is improper to claim that “as 
incommunicability increases, so too the exclusivity of the relationship increases.” 
Incommunicability is a binary characteristic that does not admit of increasing degrees.
In addition, pregnancy is not like a spousal relationship in terms of totality 
and therefore exclusivity. There is nothing whatsoever wrong with a wife carrying 
more than one child during a pregnancy, but there would be something very wrong 
with a wife having more than one husband during a marriage. Marriage involves a 
total gift of self because marriage always involves a free voluntary choice to create 
a marital union on the part of the husband and on the part of the wife at their wed-
ding. By contrast, pregnancy does not involve a total gift of self because sometimes 
a mother does not consent to being pregnant (e.g., unwanted pregnancies) and the 
human embryo obviously never consents to conception and implantation. 
Finally, it is unclear why Nelson’s argument would not apply equally well to 
breast-feeding a baby that is not one’s own biological child. If HETr violates the 
relatedness of persons, would nursing a child (an activity of great intimacy and 
connection) also be improper? If not, why not? Adoptive parents raise their non-
biological children from infancy to adulthood, (an activity of great intimacy and 
connection), yet clearly this is permissible. It is unclear why the bonds of embodied 
persons exclude the permissibility of HETr but allow nursing and post-birth adoption. 
Nelson may be correct that HETr is ethically wrong, but the arguments he offers do 
not justify his conclusion.
chrisTopher KAczor 
13 Ibid., 269.
